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C HAMBE R S O F 
JUSTIC E WILLIAM H . R E HNQUIST 
Supreme Court of the United States
Washington,D. C. 20543 
June 15, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Cases held for No. 81-430 - Illinois v. Gates 
No. 82-1711 - Colorado v. Quintero 
Respondent was arrested on suspicion of burglary, and a 
variety of stolen property was found in his possession; he 
was convicted of burglary. The facts, as described by the 
Colorado court, are as follows: 
"On September 29, 1981, at 12:45 p.m., 
Darlene Bergan was sweeping the porch of her home 
at 691 South Vine Street in Denver. It was a hot 
day and the temperature was in the 80 degree range 
or above that. Darlene Bergan's house is located 
adjacent to the bus stop at the corner of 
Exposition and Vine. She saw a man walking on the 
opposite side of the street and watched him go up 
on the porch of the house and stand at the front 
door for approximately twenty seconds, and then 
saw him stand at the front window so that he could 
peer into the front of the house for approximately 
the same amount of time. He then left the porch 
and proceeded north and appeared to be looking at 
the windows on the side of the house. He then 
walked in a northerly direction on Vine Street, 
stopped at another house, and then could not be 
seen by Mrs. Bergan. He was wearing a short 
sleeve shirt and appeared to be watching Mrs. 
Bergan. She next saw him .at 1:45 p.m. while he 
was standing at a bus stop next to her house. He 
had taken off his shirt and had used the shirt to 
cover a television set. He paced nervously and 
was trying to thumb a ride or hitchhike while 
waiting for the bus to arrive. Mrs. Bergan 
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thought he looked quite 'antsey' and called the 
police. The police radio dispatcher reported that 
a possible burglary suspect was at the corner of 
Exposition and Vine. 
Officer Freeman, a twenty-one year police 
veteran, was the first to respond and arrived 
approximately five minutes after the call was 
made. He asked Quintero for identification and 
Quintero had none. Other officers who arrived at 
the scene assisted in the investigation. Quintero 
claimed that he had bought the television set from 
someone in the neighborhood for $100 and was 
trying to go horne with it. He was in an 
undershirt and had brown wool gloves in his back 
pocket which were found in a 'pat down' search for 
weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1, 88 s.ct. 
1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While he was being 
questioned, Mrs. Bergan made herself known to the 
officers as the woman who had called the police 
and reported what she had seen. However, she did 
not tell the police officers what she had seen 
before the arrest was made. After Mrs. Bergan 
identified herself, Quintero was arrested and 
searched. Under the shirt the police found the 
television set and a video game. The police also 
found $140 in cash, five rings (including two 
class rings bearing different initials and class 
years), and some ladies jewelry in Quintero's 
pants pockets when he was searched at the police 
station. 
After the arrest was made, the officers 
checked the neighborhood and were unable to 
determine that a burglary had occurred. Later 
that day, however, the owners of a house one block 
south of Mrs. Bergan's reported that their house 
had been burglarized and that a television set and 
a video game had been stolen. The television set 
and video game that were in the possession of 
Quintero when he was arrested were identified as 
the items taken in the burglary. It was 
approximately five hours after Quintero was 
arrested that the police learned that the items 
taken were obtained in the burglary." 
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p b The Colorado Supreme Court held that the police lacked 
prob ab e cause to arrest respondent, relying principally on 
e act that at the t1me of the arrest "no evidence existed 
to establish that a crime had been committed." Because of 
th1s, seizure of the stolen property had been unlawful, and 
these 1tems should have been suppressed. The court 
expressly refused to fashion a good faith exception to the 
exclus1onary rule on the grounds that this Court was 
responsible for such changes in the law. Indeed, it 
narrowly construed a state statute authorizing use of 
ev1dence seized in good faith as extending only to errors of 
fact, not of law. 
The question whether or not the arresting officers 
possessed probable cause to arrest respondent appears not to 
be presented in the petition, which focuses on whether the 
exclusionary rule should be applied to good faith seizures 
of property. From the standpoint of recognizing a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the case does not 
present the difficulties, encountered in Gates, of inquir1ng 
into the reasonableness of a magistrate's conduct. Rather, 
the case involves on-the-street conduct of police officers 
of the sort that the reasonable, good faith exception 
generally is associated with. I think the case provides a 
potentially good vehicle for considering the good faith 
issue and I will vote to grant. 
There appear to be no jurisdictional obstacles to 
reaching the good faith question. The state court opinion 
does not cite a state constitutional provision. The 
decision discusses a state law that requires state courts to 
admit evidence seized in good faith, but construed that law 
as requiring admission only of a narrow category of 
evidence. The court did not suggest that the state law 
forbid admission of evidence not falling within this 
category, and thus, the law provides no independent and 
adequate state ground. Although the state court opinion 
cites to some of its earlier decisions in discussing the 
Fourth Amendment issue, these cases appear to rest on Fourth 
Amendment grounds; moreover, the test set out in Michigan v. 
Long, 82-256, clearly would foreclose any claim that an 
independent and adequate state ground existed. I would 
grant the petition. 
I would also be amenable to setting this case for 
argument with Michigan v. Clifford, No. 82-357, and, should 
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there be sentiment to grant that case, Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, No. 82-963 (see accompanying hold memo). 
Sincerely, 
